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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROSIE LEON,

:

Appellant,

:

Priority Classification
No. 14b

:

Civil No. 870226

vs.
SUSAN PHILLIPS,
Respondent.
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
Appeal from the Second Judicial District Court
Davis County, Judge Douglas Cornaby
I.

AUTHORITY
This

appeal

was

brought

under the authority of Utah

Code Ann. Section 78-2-2(3)(1).

II.

NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This appeal is from

motion for

new trial

in of

a final

judgment and

denial of a

the District Court of Davis County,

State of Utah.

III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW

refusing

A,

Did

to

grant

the

trial

the

court

Plaintiff

abuse

its

discretion

in

a one and one-half hour con-

tinuance to secure her next witness?
B.

Was the

trial court's

tinuance prejudicial error?

refusal to

grant the con-

IV.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND
ORDINANCE
Rule 40, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule ol, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

V.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the case.

The case

arose when the Plaintiff claimed to have been

injured by the Defendants negligent driving.
The case was filed

in

the

Second

District

Court in

Davis County, and proceeded to a jury verdict for the Defendant.
The

Plaintiff

claims

an

abuse

of the trial count's

discretion in denying a continuance to call a witness and alleges
error in the denial of a motion for new trial based on the denial
of continuance.
B.

Course of Proceedings and relevant dates.

Plaintiff filed her complaint on

March

19,

1984.

A

three day trial began on February 5, 1987.
C.

Relevant Facts.

Plaintiff alleged
1983 when a truck driven by
motor home

as the

that she was injured on September 3,
the Defendant

struck the

side of a

Plaintiff was climbing into the motor home in

the parking lot of an Albertson's Super Market in Layton, Utah.
A jury trial commenced in the case on
and continued for three days.

3

February 5, 1987

Three independent
occurred and

matched

that
the

that the impact

that they had given the licence number of the truck

which hit the motor
testified

witnesses testified

home

the

plates

Defendant admitted

to

a

policeman.

license

number

on

Defendant's

the

to him

that she

The

officer also

given him by the witnesses
truck,

and

that the

was present in the truck at

the alleged time and place.
The Defendant at trial admitted to being in the parking
lot and

to driving past the motor home, but claimed that she did

not strike it with her truck.
On the second day
Nord, Defendant's

of trial

principal medical

the Plaintiff

witness, to testify out-of-

turn during the course of the Plaintiff's case.
of

trial,

Plaintiff's

counsel

allowed Dr.

completed

The last morning

the questioning of a

witness approximately 10:30 a.m. and then informed the court that
Dr. Tedrow,

another witness

courtroom and that
testify

that

counsel

morning.

called by the Defendant, was in the
had

agreed

Defendant's

that

Dr.

counsel then informed the

court that he did not wish to call Dr. Tedrow at that
court then

Tedrow cculd

time.

The

requested Plaintiff to proceed with Plaintiff't> case.

Plaintiff's counsel
agreement to
Plaintiff had

informed

let Dr.

the

court

Tedrow testify

not scheduled

her next

that,

out of

because

of his

turn that morning,

witness, a rehabilitation

expert, until after the noon recess.
The court

then ordered

immediately call Plaintiff's next
4

Plaintiff to either rest or to
witness.

Plaintiff moved the

court for

a one

and one-half hour continuance to procure Plain-

tiff's next witness.
for continuance

then denied

Plaintiff's motion

and again ordered the Plaintiff to either call a

witness or to rest.
protest.

The court

The

Plaintiff then

rested her

case under

The Defendant then called Dr. Tedrow to the stand.
After the

noon recess,

the case

was submitted to the

jury and, after deliberating, the jury returned a verdict for the
Defendant.

Judgment was entered in accordance with the verdict,

and the Plaintiff appeals from that judgment and

from the denial

of a motion for new trial.

VI.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The

trial

court

abused

its

discretion

Plaintiff's motion for continuance.

The

denial left

by

denying

the Plain-

tiff without an important witness whose testimony was relevant to
the issue of liability and was

a denial

of Plaintiff's substan-

tial rights to justice.

VII. ARGUMENT
POINT ONE:

THE TESTIMONY

FOR WHICH

PLAINTIFF SOUGHT THE CON

TINUANCE WAS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE OF LIABILITY.
Alan Heal,
to

call

as

Plaintiff's

the

the rehabilitation

next

vocational

witness, would have testified concerning
impairment

proffer of evidence, Record at P 3.)
would have

tended

to

expert Plaintiff sought

make

from

5

injuries.

(See

If believed, such testimony

plaintiff's

credible.

her

claim

of

injury more

The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants truck struck
Plaintiff's motor home injuring
claimed no

the

Plaintiff.

other theory of defense.

Defendant was not negligent,

The Defendant

The jury's verdict that the

therefore, was

a finding

that the

collision did not occur.
Mr. Heal?s

testimony would

contention that she was injured.
Plaintiff's

claim

of

injury

have supported Plaintiff's

Any testimony

more

tending to make

credible would also tend to

support the alleged collision.

POINT TWO:

THE COURT'S DENIAL OF A CONTINUANCE WAS INCONSISTENT WITH SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE FOR THE PLAINTIFF.

A similar

case was decided by the Kansas Supreme Court

in Slavenburg v. Bautts, 561 P.2d 423 (Kansas 1977).
In Slavenburg, the Defendant

was denied

a contmuaiiCe

to call a iredical witness.
The case arose out of an automobile accident in Kansas.
The fact of the accident was
defendant denied

not

contested

at

trial, but the

that the Plaintiff had been injured and alleged

that any disability pre-dated the accident.
At the end of
informed the

the second

had

allowed

He explained to the

witnesses

accommodate the Plaintiff, and that
earlier than

trial, tht Defendant

court that he could not call his next witness unti.1

1:30 p.m. the following day.
Defendant

day of

1:30 p.m.

to

court that the

be called out of order to

the

doctor

could

not come

The court then ordered the defendant to

present evidence beginning at 9:00 a.m. the next morning.
6

When Defendant had no witnesses in
the following

morning, the

defendant had rested its

court at

9:00 a.m.

court announced to the jury that the

case.

The defendant

appealed from an

adverse verdict.
The Kansas

Supreme Court

quoted from

an earlier case

the following pertinent reasoning:
It is the duty of litigants to exercise great
diligence both in prosecuting and in defending actions
in court, and, as there are usually many cases set for
hearing at each term of the district courts, the
orderly dispatch of the business and the protection of
other litigants from expensive delays and accumulating
costs make it the duty of the court strictly to require
the parties to every action to be ready foi trial
promptly at the time the case is set for hearing or to
prove that in the exercise of due diligence they have
been unable to do so.
So great is the necessity for
the prompt dispatch of court business that the statute
authorizes courts to and they generally do impose upon
the unfortunate litigant who, even through no fault of
his own, is unprepared to proceed at the time set all
the costs of the necessary delay. This is usually
sufficient to insure the making of every reasonable
effort to be ready at the time appointed, unless
vexation and delay to be the real object of the
litigation or unless some real or fancied advantage may
accrue to one party by a course of procrastination. In
such cases of designed obstruction or in the case of
gross or reckless infection, if the fault be on the
part of the plaintiff, it may become the duty of the
court to dismiss his action; if the defendant be at
fault he may be penalized by proceeding with the trial
notwithstanding his unieadmess.
"The incidents of life, however, refuse to conform
themselves to the plans of any man or to march in
regular procession on the order of any court or earthly
power.
Even death steps in at the most unanticipated
times to stay proceedings. It should be borne in mind
that mere order and regularity of proceeding are not
the purpose for which courts exist and are held, but
are only aids to the grand purpose of dispensing
justice, and should not be carried to the extreme and
become the cause of injustice. xExtreme justice is
injustice.'"
7

Bane v. Cox, 88 P. 1083, at PP. 185, 186
The court then noted further that:
The power to grant a recess is inherent within the
trial court's power to control the orderly movement of
cases within sound judicial discretion...This includes
the right to deny or grant a recess due to the absence
of a witness.
Exercise of this discretion, however,
demands consideration of many factors. In ruling on a
motion to recess because a witness is unavailable the
court must consider and balance factors including
counsel's diligence and effort to gain attendance of
the witness, the reason the witness is not present, the
nature of the witness's expected testimony, whether the
testimony is critical evidence or merely cumulative,
the amount of the delay expected, the effect of the
delay on the docket of the court, and the overall
injustice which might result if the delay were denied.

Having objectively considered the foregoing balancing
factors, we believe a new trial should be granted.
Slavenburg at P. 428
Rule 61 of the Utah Rules
that ruling

of Civil

Procedure requires

and judgment not be disturbed unless it appearb that

the ruling appears to be "inconsistent with substantial justices"
and must effect the ''substantial rights of the parties."
In Rowley

v. Graven

Eros and Co., 491 P.2d 1209 (Utah

1971), this court set fortr. the following test:
"The test to be applied is: Was there error or irregularity such that there is a reasonable likelihood
to believe that in its absence there would have been a
result more favorable to (the appellant)?

The

Appellant,

of

course,

cannot

know or prove the

effect of the omitted testimony on the outcome of the trial.

8

The Plaintiff

wishes the court to know that she cannot

afford a transcript of the complete trial.
a transcript

While she

knows that

would be very helpful to the court in surveying the

whole evidence, she respectfully asks the

court to

consider the

undisputed evidence set forth in her statement of the facts.
She firmly believes that justice and fairness require a
new trial with a full and fair opportunity to call

the witnesses

of her choosing.

VIII. CONCLUSION
The denial of a opportunity to call a important witness
was a denial of Plaintiff's substantial rights.
The trial

court's denial

of Plaintiff's

motion for a

new trial shculd be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

this

day of April, 1938.

HELGESEN & WATERFALL

JACK C. HELGESEN
Attorney for Appellant

9

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true
of the

and correct copy

foregoing Brief of Appellant to Robert G. Gilchrist,

RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON, P.O. Box 2465, Salt Lake City,

Utah 84110, postage prepaid, this

day of April, 1988.

Secretary
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ROBERT G. GILCHRIST
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Attorneys for Defendant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROSIE M. LEON#
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.
SUSAN PHILLIPS,
Defendant*

Civil No.:

35305

This action came on for jury trial before the court
and jury, with the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, presiding,
and the issues having been duly presented and tried, and the
jury having answered the special verdict form, and having found
that the defendant, Susan Phillips was not negligent, and
therefore that there was no cause of action, that
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
plaintiff take nothing, that the action be dismissed on the
merits, with each party to bear their own costs of this action.

FILMED

DATED this

„•?

day of

/fsrrA

1987.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of
the foregoing instrument was nailed, first class, postage
prepaid on this 44+*day olJjtfJjtfUJtAtJ^
1987, to the
following counsel of record:
(J
Jack C. Helgesen
HELGESEN & WATERFALL
2650 Washington Blvd, Suite 102
Ogden, Utah 84401
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ROBERT G. GILCHRIST
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON
Attorneys for Defendant
CSB Tower, Suite 700
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 531-1777
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROSIE M. LEON,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.
SUSAN PHILLIPS,
Defendant.

Civil No.:

35305

The plaintiff's motion for a judgment not
withstanding the verdict, having been orally presented to the
court, on February 9, 1987, with the plaintiff being present
and represented by her counsel of record Jack C. Helgesen,
and the defendant being present and being represented by her
counsel of record Robert G. Gilchrist, and the court having
heard argument, and reviewed the matter, that
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion is
denied.

FILMED

DATED this

^.

day of

y ^ „ /

1987,

BY/THE COURT:

fORABLB' DOUGDHh-L. CORNABY
District Court Judge
/

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was mailed, first class, postage prepaid
on this £0*^
day of ^^MSULOJUU
1987, to the following
counsel of record:
Jack C. Helgesen
2650 Washington Blvd., Suite 102
Ogden, Utah 84401
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ROBERT G. GILCHRIST
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON
Attorneys for Defendant
CSB Tower, Suite 700
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 531-1777

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROSIE LEON,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.
SUSAN PHILLIPS,
Civil No.: 35305
Defendant.

The plaintiff's motion for a new trial having been
filed with the court, and defendant having responded with a
brief, and the court having reviewed the matter pursuant to
Rule 2.8, that pursuant to the grounds stated in the court's
ruling on motion for new trial dated May 6, 1987,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion for
a new trial is denied.

"

DATED this

j?^— day of

1987.

^

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of
the foregoing instrument was mailed, first class, postage
prepaid on this /J5**" day of
<-Wu.
, 1987, to the
following counsel of record ofl/Vf
Jack Helgesen
2650 Washington Blvd., Suite 102
Ogden, Utah 84401
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JACK C. HELGESEN
HELGESEN & WATERFALL, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiff
4768 Harrison Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84403
Telephone: (801) 479-4777
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BY.
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DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY
ROSIE M. LEON,
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

Civil No.

SUSAN PHILLIPS,

35305

Defendant/Respondent.
Notice

is

hereby

given

Plaintiff/Appellant,

hereby

Supreme

the

Court

from

that

appeals

final

to

ROSIE
the

M.

LEON,

Utah State

judgment entered in this

action on the 22nd day of May, 1987.
DATED this

\<ftr

day of June, 1987.
HELGESEN & WATERFALL

*£L

JACK7 C. HE#&ESEN
Attorney for
Plaintiff/Appellant

FILMED

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true
copy of
this

IA

the foregoing

and correct

NOTICE OF APPEAL, postage prepaid,

day of June, 1987 to the following:
Robert G. Gilchrist
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
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